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Using location-based services (LBS) is the new trend for mobile users. LBS mostly
exploit GPS and WLAN infrastructures for outdoor and indoor environments, re-
spectively, in order to determine a user's location. After a location is known to a
LBS, the network can provide location related contextual information such as nearby
events, places, or navigation for the mobile users. Currently, LBS have been speciﬁ-
cally growing rapidly in the domain of indoor positioning as more public places, e.g.
schools, shopping centers, and airports are being equipped with WLAN networks.
The aforementioned situation leads to the fact that huge amount of tracking data
gets possessed by a wide variety of diﬀerent LBS and it poses the risk of location
privacy violation of citizens. The problem is not only that this information reveals
the places that a person has visited, but that it can also expose their behaviors and
habits to the LBS and associated third parties. The conditions exacerbate as there
are no appropriate regulations on how the tracking data is used by the LBS. In
addition, the LBS data servers are under constant attacks by third parties who seek
to access this kind of valuable data. Furthermore, the private sector has initiated
the tracking of their customers in such places as shopping malls by means of simply
collecting their MAC addresses.
The thesis is divided into two parts. In the literature part of this thesis, diﬀerent
indoor positioning techniques, location privacy leaks, and the solutions to tackle the
problem will be explained. In the second part, we show practical implementation
examples about how and at what extent a user may be positioned by the network,
based simply on the mobile MAC address or using jointly MAC and signal strength
information.
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11. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, positioning systems will be brieﬂy reviewed. In addition, the moti-
vation, thesis objectives, and outline of the thesis will be presented.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Nowadays, the majority of people use diﬀerent kind of communications devices
thanks to ubiquitous computing. As a result, communications devices have become
integrated in most aspects of our daily lives and the use of positioning systems have
widely spread throughout societies. Global Positioning System (GPS) and mobile
location estimation service, which is based on exploiting wireless communications
networks, are the most common ways used for localizing a device. Location infor-
mation is used by location-based services (LBS) to provide useful services, such as
navigation or ﬁnding a nearby event for their clients.
Due to the growing number of users who become interested in using Location-Based
Services, the LBS providers access to huge amount of information about attitudes
of individuals as more people use these kinds of services. Although the users beneﬁt
from receiving the localization services, their whereabouts get exposed to the loca-
tion service providers. It is important to point out that a user's location trace not
only reveals their location on a map, but also the contextual data related to a trace
shows a person's activities, interests, and habits.
With the growing number of cloud data centers in recent years, companies and
governments have been able to store users tracking data for long-term periods for
diﬀerent reasons such as advertising, service providing, or national security. The
downside of this trend is that the privacy of users is being put at risk due to the
lack of eﬀective privacy rules and potential adversary attacks to these data centers.
Problems arise as these companies and the governments have no incentive in modi-
fying their data collection and storage strategies to beneﬁt the end users. Therefore,
it is important to enhance the privacy of the users by means of privacy-preserving
techniques, that brings about a trade-oﬀ between service quality and the level of
privacy [34].
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Indoor positioning can be considered as a new trend in the ﬁeld of mobile positioning
and it is creating new opportunities for businesses. As people spend so much time
indoors, working, shopping, and so on, the LBS providers are trying to facilitate the
ability for indoor positioning for their clients. One of the most practical systems to
be used for indoor positioning is wireless local area network (WLAN), where a lot of
eﬀort has been put in order to increase the positioning accuracy. However, privacy
related issues in positioning have been vastly neglected so far. Since every mobile
device connecting to a wireless network is recognized by its unique Media Access
Control (MAC) address, it is an unsolved challenge for the mobile users to be able
to anonymously use the LBS [29].
1.2 Thesis objectives and author contributions
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the vulnerability of user location pri-
vacy in wireless local area networks. The main idea is to investigate how accurately
a mobile device can be localized by its associated network administrator without
the acknowledgment of the user. Furthermore, in order to provide a perspective
on the subject of location privacy, a comprehensive literature review has been con-
ducted about potential privacy leaks and privacy-preserving methods in diﬀerent
network layers. In addition, the procedure of data utilization and exploiting them
by a network administrator or an adversary for user localization purposes has been
simulated and analyzed in MATLAB environment.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
In this thesis, the concept of privacy in indoor positioning will be described, and
the fundamentals of indoor positioning will be explained. This thesis consists of
six chapters. While this ﬁrst chapter acts as a general introduction to the topic,
chapter 2 explores WLAN-based indoor positioning, and elaborates on the key prin-
ciples of positioning methods, i.e. proximity sensing, model-based approaches and
ﬁngerprinting-based approaches. Chapters 3 and 4 analyze privacy leaks and current
solutions, respectively. Furthermore, chapter 5 and chapter 6 illustrate how indoor
positioning can be performed in a terminal-based system and network-based system,
respectively. In addition, we present examples with real data on how a network can
locate the user with only basic information, such as MAC address or both MAC
address and RSS. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main points of this thesis.
32. WLAN-BASED INDOOR POSITIONING
IEEE 802.11 standard speciﬁes the characteristics of the Medium Access Control
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) and
has been modiﬁed periodically since its ﬁrst release in 1997. As a result, a wide vari-
ety of amendments have been made to the original version of IEEE 802.11. Currently,
the most widespread versions of WLAN implementations are: IEEE 802.11b func-
tioning in the license-free 2.4 GHz frequency band and having an average throughput
of 11 Mbps that provides a transmission range less than a few hundred of meters and
IEEE 802.11g which beneﬁts from a higher data rate of 54 Mbps. In addition, IEEE
802.11n is the most common standard that supports multiple-input multiple-output
antennas over 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz frequency bands. By using multiple antennas,
the network throughput increases to 600 Mbps. WLANs contain one or more Access
Points (APs), each of which serve a group of Wireless Stations (STAs) that form a
Basic Service Set (BSS). An AP covers a limited area called as Basic Service Area
(BSA) [1].
Nowadays, WLAN services are widely available to the public, both in private and
public premises such as hospitals, airports, shopping centers, university campuses,
homes, etc. The current conditions make it promising for exploitation of WLAN
equipment for demanding indoor positioning applications. In addition, a lot of
eﬀort has been put into utilizing the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs)
for indoor positioning without achieving the desired goals [28]. For instance, one
well established positioning system is Global Positioning System (GPS) that has
been open to the public since 2000. However, owing to the fact that GPS signal
strength drops to about -160 dB indoors, it is hard for conventional GPS receivers
to function correctly indoors [41].
The procedure of acquiring the location of a STA is called WLAN positioning. It
can be achieved by measuring the signal characteristics that are position dependent
such as Time of Arrival (ToA), Time Diﬀerence of Arrival (TDoA), Angle of Arrival
(AoA), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and Received Signal Strength (RSS). In order
to implement range measurement techniques like ToA, TDoA, and AoA, not only
precise time synchronization and angle measurements are required, but also, due to
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non-line-of-sight (NLOS) propagation, shadowing, and multipath eﬀect, additional
short time delays occur that complicate the positioning process. Consequently, the
three above-mentioned features are not widely used in the current WLAN-based
indoor positioning systems. On the other hand, SNR and RSS values are calculated
by capturing the IEEE 802.11 beacon frames that are broadcast by non-synchronized
WLAN transceivers periodically. By using RSS information for positioning, there is
no need for costly extra network equipment, thus the majority of WLAN positioning
techniques are deployed or being developed based on SNR and RSS measurements
[28].
Three main positioning techniques that exploit the beacon frame features will be
discussed in this chapter as follows:
 Proximity sensing.
 Model-based approaches.
 Fingerprinting-based approaches.
2.1 Proximity sensing
Proximity sensing is a straightforward method in which a mobile device gets the
MAC address of the access point with the highest signal strength. It is also known
under the name of AP-ID, by analogy with the Cell-ID method in cellular networks.
Afterwards, the MAC address is sent to a location provider, such as Google, Sky-
hook, HERE maps, etc., which can map the MAC address to a physical location in
the real world. As a result, location of the user is exposed to the location provider
[19].
Owing to the simplicity of this method, it fails to prepare a satisfactory level of
accuracy. The position error can be even as high as hundred of meters, based on the
AP ranges and on the number of APs installed in the premises. In an ideal system,
in which APs are densely deployed, the accuracy increases signiﬁcantly. Embedding
room or corridor numbers into the beacon frames can also make the system more
accurate [28] but this requires modiﬁcation to the WLAN system.
2.2 Model-based approaches
Model-based approaches, also referred to path-loss-based approaches, use mathemat-
ical radio propagation models for calculating the position of a user by comparing the
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Figure 2.1 Lateration technique with three APs.
RSS with the transmitted signal strength from several access points. Since a later-
ation technique is used in this approach, the position of the access points must be
known to the system as depicted in Figure 2.1. When creating the model, the impact
of dynamic and chaotic conditions of the indoor environment on the transmitted sig-
nals must be taken into account because the signal attenuation occurs constantly
due to free-space path loss, shadowing, and the multipath eﬀects caused by receiv-
ing diﬀerent versions of the same signal [29]. Absorption, scattering, diﬀraction and
reﬂection caused by the walls, ﬂoors, furniture, and so on are extremely diﬃcult to
be predicted and modeled in a building. Therefore, the positioning process by using
the mathematical models do not produce accurate results; furthermore, additional
overheads are incurred because the signal strength at the transmitter must be known
for calculating the path loss [28].
2.3 Fingerprinting-based approaches
Fingerprinting-based approaches comprise two phases. In the oine phase, also
known as training or calibration, the access points' signal strength at predeﬁned
reference points, for example as shown in blue dots in Figure 2.2, are sampled and
saved into a radio map. The data structure of the radio map consists of a set
of vectors v = (x; y; z; RSS1; :::; RSSn) in which (x; y; z) are the coordinates of a
reference point and n is the number of access points 'heard' in that reference point.
Therefore, the radio map contains spatial features of RSS patterns in a location
[19],[29].
In the online phase, after the RSSs at a mobile station (MS) are measured and
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Figure 2.2 Example of reference points.
the best matching reference point in the radio map is found, the coordinates of
that reference point is announced as the position of the MS. Therefore, the main
challenge in creating a radio map is that it is a time consuming process to collect
the data and the radio map has to be recreated regularly to account for changes in
the topology of the access points. Forming a radio map in this way is also called as
empirical approach [19].
Two other methods are used to deploy the empirical approach; deterministic and
probabilistic. In the former, as proposed by Bahl and Padmanabhan in their po-
sitioning system RADAR in [5], ﬁrst the mean value of several recorded RSSs is
assigned to a reference point in the radio map. Then, in the online phase a metric
introduced as Nearest Neighbor in Signal Space (NNSS) technique uses Euclidean
distance to determine the location of the user:
D =
nX
k=1
q
(RSSo;k  RSSr;k)2: (2.1)
where RSSo;k is the observed signal strength by the device and RSSr;k is the recorded
one in the radio map. Having calculated the set of D, the reference point that has
the minimum relevant D is reported as the location of the user. In a dynamic
experimental location that had an area of 980 m2, over 50 rooms, 70 reference
points and 3 access points, RADAR achieved a median deviation of approximately
3 meters while reducing the number of reference points to 40 and performing 3 times
of RSS measurements throughout the online phase [5]. Nevertheless, the accuracy
2.3. Fingerprinting-based approaches 7
  
Figure 2.3 Plan of the building in which the measurements were done in [42] . The
dimension is 68 meters by 26 meters and the width of the corridor is 1.5 meters.
of the system much depends on the orientation of the RSS and moving pace of the
MS. The disadvantage of deterministic method is that NNSS must be run over each
of the elements in the radio map to match the corresponding reference point.
Probabilistic ﬁngerprinting is the other method that uses probability distributions
of the signal strength values to alleviate noise eﬀects during the online phase that
cause deviation from the recorded RSSs. Furthermore, by using location clustering,
data processing can be facilitated signiﬁcantly. Using both the probability distribu-
tions of the signal strength and location clustering in a positioning system is called
Joint Clustering and functions as follows. To create a cluster, the reference points
that hear the same set of APs are grouped during the oine phase and saved in the
radiomap. Afterwards, during the online phase, the cluster that has the most com-
mon APs with the the heard APs by a user's device is chosen. Finally, positioning
is implemented by comparing the probability distributions of the RSSs in a set of
APs in the chosen cluster and the heard APs [28].
Youssef et al. in [42] introduced a positioning system that exploits the joint cluster-
ing technique to reduce both the noise eﬀect and computational costs. The proposed
system was tested on an IEEE 802.11 WLAN framework in a university building
having an area of 6096 square meters. In order to create the radio map, reference
points were deﬁned on a grid having cells located 1.2 meters from each other along
the corridors . In addition, there were 110 reference points in each of which, around
4 access points were heard, and 300 samples were measured in each reference point
at 1 second periods. As a result, positioning was performed on a terminal-based
system eﬀectively with an accuracy of 2 meters in 90% of cases. The plan of the
building used in the experiment of [42] can be seen in Figure 2.3. By using joint clus-
tering technique computational complexity reduced to the extent that positioning
could be implemented on user's mobile device.
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Figure 2.4 Three conﬁguration possibilities used in ﬁngerprinting.
In order to deploy the above mentioned system, during the oine phase a joint
probability distribution model was formed, using Maximum Likelihood Estimation
method, given the RSSs in each reference point. In addition, the location was
grouped into clusters, each of which were built up of the reference points that were
covered by the same APs. Then, during the online phase a cluster was chosen so that
the most probable location according to the measured RSS would be searched in it.
Afterwards, using Bayesian inference, the most probable reference point related to
the observed RSSs was determined.
Fingerprinting can be developed based on three conﬁgurations. The diﬀerent ways
that tasks are assigned to three network entities (i.e. wireless terminals, access
points, and servers) during positioning process, not only determine how the system
functions but also aﬀect scalability and privacy signiﬁcantly. Figure 2.4 shows three
possible conﬁgurations in an infrastructure-based positioning system as follows:
 Network-based.
 Terminal-assisted.
 Terminal-based.
First, there is the network-based case as it can be seen in Figure 2.4(a) in which
the radio map is formed using signal strength of beacon frames broadcast by the
terminals and measured by the access points in oine phase. Then, during the online
phase, the location of the terminal is calculated by the servers and announced to the
user [28]. The advantage of this system is that it is highly scalable, since there is
no need to adjust the system for each new terminal and they can be automatically
located as they enter a place that makes it convenient for asset tracking. However, it
can turn into a privacy invasion tool as people can be tracked sporadically without
being notiﬁed [19].
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Second, there is the terminal-assisted case in which the terminal is responsible for
measuring and sending RSSs to the servers and servers are responsible for main-
taining the radio map and determining the location as depicted in Figure 2.4(b)
[28]. This system is deployed when the current infrastructure cannot be modiﬁed in
order to take on the whole workload, for functioning as a network-based positioning
system. Although the users know about exposing their data to the system, there is
no other choice if they intend to be located [19]. As a result, user location privacy
in this case is also low.
Finally, there is the terminal-based case in which the radio map is saved in the
wireless terminal by recording the RSS downlink measurements. Using the radio
map and RSS observations, the terminal determines its location as shown in Figure
2.4(c) [28]. This method is assumed to be the most privacy-preserving method.
However, in practice, it is challenging to be implemented due to the fact that there
are constraints on transmission and maintenance of the bulk radio maps on a single
device [19].
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3. POTENTIAL PRIVACY RISKS IN
WLAN-BASED INDOOR POSITIONING
Location-Based Services (LBS) provide the opportunity for mobile users to discover
their surroundings and are proliferating in many dimensions of our everyday lives so
that market for LBS could rocket from 2.8 to 10.3 billion dollars in a ﬁve-year period
from 2010 through 2015 [46]. Social networks, such as Facebook or Twitter enable
people to connect an activity to a location, tools such as Foursquare let people check
in as they visit a place, and applications such as Yelp oﬀer the opportunity to ﬁnd
proximate businesses or events. These are some examples that point out to the
fact that LBS are being widely used in most aspects of our activities. However, a
user may contribute to build up a tracking map history of all their visited locations
unwillingly on a data server. Such tracking map history may be kept by quite a
few of the LBS for an unlimited time. Moreover, privacy-related issues arise as on
the one hand, existing privacy rules and regulations belong to decades ago, when
LBS was not yet introduced, and on the other hand, the majority of them take sides
against user privacy. All the above-mentioned matters make privacy subject of vital
importance nowadays [34].
LBS usually exploit a vast variety of methods to collect customer information. For
instance, Google implements its LBS based on the following three types of data:
ﬁrst, there is the implicit location information, in which the interest of a user in a
speciﬁc location is determined, for example, if a user just looked up a place on the
Internet. Second, there is the Internet traﬃc information, in which the IP address
of a user is used to oﬀer services to the end-users in an appropriate language and
context according to the residing country. Third, there are the device-based location
services, that require precise positioning of the device by using GPS signals, RF
sensors, WLAN signals, and cell tower IDs [3]. This enables the LBS to integrate
identity, location, and search terms of users, in order to produce a comprehensive
data history for each of them; in addition, social networking sites can access their
customers' photos, comments, friends list, gender, and etc. enabling them to create
more detailed proﬁle datasets [34].
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To sum up, privacy violation of individuals or organizations can threaten civil lib-
erties, which is an important indicator of the degree of democracy in a society. For
instance, the U.S. governmental agencies account for the majority of requests to
access citizens location information [34].
3.1 User privacy concerns based on survey results
Yun et al. applied Uniﬁed Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT)
in [43] on adoption and diﬀusion of LBS applications. The purpose was to ascertain
the role of users' privacy expectations on the key constructs of UTAUT. The notion
of privacy in LBS stems from the fact that of all cellphone users in North America
and Europe, 33% and 20% of them use LBS respectively [33]. Yun et al. tried to
determine how privacy concerns impact on spread of LBS applications. They found
that subjects tend to respond to the technology as follows. First, privacy concerns
slow down the spread of the technology among those who use the technology for the
sake of performance expectancy, e.g. productivity-oriented LBS applications such as
search engines, maps, and taxi services. Second, those who are more concerned about
privacy seem to be the ones who use LBS more frequently than others. Therefore,
users accept to take some risk due to the social inﬂuence, while they are still worried
about their privacy. All in all, in order to increase the penetration rate of LBS for the
ﬁrst group it is necessary to satisfy both the performance and the information privacy
expectations of the users. Meanwhile, for the second group persuasive marketing
techniques to increase the social inﬂuence seems to be promising regarding the spread
of LBS usage.
According to Ozer [34], there is already a high demand for accessing location tracking
by law enforcement agencies and this poses a risk to users' privacy. A survey reveals
that 55% of LBS users are already concerned about their privacy [2]. Consequently,
LBS diﬀusion can be hindered if the consumers believe that LBS applications are not
to their advantage, given privacy issues. The study in [40] shows that 34 percent of
LBS providers lack privacy policies. Regarding the companies that do have privacy
policies, some lack transparency in their policies on how they use the information,
and some others place no restrictions on the amount of data they collect and how
they use them. In addition, location service providers do not give any guarantee to
stop them from handing the information to other companies or organizations. As a
result, it is worth mentioning that users would feel more conﬁdent in dealing with
LBS having concrete privacy practices.
In another study by Cheng et al. [8], public Wi-Fi users' information was gathered
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from 15 airports located in 4 countries. Analytics show that the exposure of trans-
mitted data was approximately 70 percent while the public awareness about privacy
vulnerability, caused by using public hotspots is quite low. The problem originates
in the fact that there are no security methods implemented in this kind of networks,
since they are meant to be as easily accessible as possible to travelers; on the other
hand, based on the public networks policies, it's usually the users responsibility to
take care of their privacy. Moreover, advertising businesses make money gathering
consumers' private data.
Privacy leakage sources are categorized into three diﬀerent areas in [8]. Firstly, there
are users' devices that may use a multicast Domain Name System (mDNS) protocol
that includes some human readable data, such as name resolution. Secondly, there
are websites that may disclose a user's attributes using HTTP cookies, since many
of Internet content providers track a user who surfs their website pages. Thirdly,
there are online advertising companies that send advertisements to a user based on
their browsing history, and this history can also be easily used to extract some other
relevant information about the user. Overall, cellular networks oﬀer higher levels of
privacy preserving than public WiFi networks, but lead to high cost for subscribers.
3.2 Interception of user position by third parties
Currently, LBS are mainly provided by a means of communication between a user
and a third party that results in the disclosure of user location to the third parties.
According to [36], malicious LBS privacy issues can be categorized as query privacy
and location privacy. In the former a user's query may be associated to their identity
or an attribute of them by an LBS provider. For instance, regular queries about
a political party's headquarters can reveal one's political trends. In the latter, a
user's information is revealed according to their location. For example, if a user is
located in a library it may infer that the user is interested in reading books. Location
privacy and query privacy are closely related, so that locating a user can help to
disclose a user's identity even though they use a location anonymizer. Accoriding to
[22], a location anonymizer is a trusted party that functions as a medium between
a user and a service provider. Assuming that the communication between the user
and service provider is through an unsecured channel, an attacker could reidentify
the users by accessing their locaiton queries. The task of the trusted party is to hide
the exact location of the query issuer among k   1 other users' queries, in order to
decrease the probabilty of reidentiﬁcation to 1=k.
As metioned in [21], mobile advertising is another concept that exploits context
information of a user in order to oﬀer tailored advertisements. For instance, as
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a user passes by a store, the relevant advertisements about that store pop up on
their web browser. Although the beneﬁts for both businesses and customers soar,
privacy issues arise at the same time, since the advertiser accesses location data and
activities of the users. To use the services, a user must trust the service provider;
however, due to the vast amount of data and its signiﬁcance, it is unrealistic to expect
a company to be able to combat all the diﬀerent adversarial attacks against their
database systems. Also, an employee working with a server-only personalization
system, e.g. Google and Yahoo, can easily access users identity. To address the
problem, client-only systems can be employed so that sensitive data are stored on
the user device. Systems such as Privad [20] and Repriv [16] oﬀer a trade-oﬀ between
server-only and client-only architectures.
According to [24], an Android mobile phone can be tracked by measuring the power
consumed by its cellular radio. The idea is that there is a direct relationship be-
tween a cellular phone's distance from the associated cellular tower and its power
consumption. Therefore, by creating a power consumption map for diﬀerent geo-
graphical locations, one can ﬁnd the location of a mobile user. However, this method
is eﬀective as long as the user is moving and the attacker has a prior knowledge of
the places a user may visit. In addition, it is important to know the exact power
consumption used only by the cellular radio antenna not by the applications. Still,
a malicious application can track a user without asking for permission to access
location data, as it only needs to access power data and network connectivity data.
3.3 Quantifying user privacy
Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) is the practice of extracting information
from datasets without exposing individual information about the users. Working
with large amounts of data makes the process of privacy preserving diﬃcult, due to
the possible diﬀerent ways in aggregating information about datasets. The lack of
a comprehensive standard in the functionality of employed privacy preserving algo-
rithms, in addition to the availability of many diﬀerent types of them, poses serious
privacy related problems when designing and using privacy preserving algorithms.
In order to tackle the problem, a set of metrics are proposed in the literature that
will be discussed in the following.
One of the novel researches done in the ﬁeld of location privacy is the work done
by Shokri et al. [38], in which quantifying diﬀerent Location-Privacy Protection
Mechanisms (LPPMs) is the aim of the proposed system. They claim that the
lack of a standardized method for quantifying LPPMs' performance is a serious
issue in location privacy as in PPDM. They believe that there is a lack of emphasis
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on modeling the adversary's attack conditions leading to inaccurate evaluation of
privacy risks of the users. A framework is introduced so that takes into account
both the prior knowledge and the attack methods of the adversary. The metric
used in their quantiﬁcation method is based on statistical methods, which is the
estimation error of the attacker, presented as a tool: Location-Privacy Meter [37].
The location-privacy framework comprises of six diﬀerent entities as shown in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1 Location-privacy framework, from [38].
U A set of users
A A set of actual traces of the users
LPPM Location-privacy preserving mechanism
O A set of traces, which is produced by LPPM, and observed by adversary
ADV Adversary
METRIC Performance of the adversary
Users produce a set of traces A, which are obfuscated traces produced probabilis-
tically by the LPPM as O and the adversary tries to infer to A by having access
to Os. X is deﬁned as a set of values that the function of the attacker's objective
can take for an attack. Since the attacker uses probabilistic methods, it can only
extract an estimate of the real traces from the obfuscated location in the form of a
posterior distribution function Pr(xjO); x 2 X.
Adversary performance is the core of the location privacy quantiﬁcation and can
be evaluated according to its accuracy, certainty and correctness. However, the
correctness of the attack is the metric used to quantify the location privacy. Equation
3.1 is the expected estimation error of the adversary where cPr(xjO) is an estimate
of the posterior distribution function Pr(xjO), xc is the real distance from the user,
and x is the observed track by the adversary.
Ee(xc; O) =
X
x
cPr(xjO)kx  xck: (3.1)
According to Zhang et al. in [44], there are already many LBS Privacy Protection
Mechanisms (LPPMs) proposed in the literature by researchers. Nevertheless, due to
the lack of a generic adversarial model, it is problematic to evaluate the performance
of the current LPPMs. Zhang et al. proposed a privacy quantiﬁcation model to
create a general adversarial model based on the adversary's estimation error. As
a result, the privacy quantiﬁcation model allows interpretation and comparison of
diﬀerent LBS privacy metrics based on a common perspective. The evaluation has
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been done based on an adversarial observation and the Bayes conditional risk was
used as the privacy metric.
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4. CURRENT SOLUTIONS FOR
PRIVACY-PRESERVING INDOOR
LOCALIZATION
In this chapter diﬀerent methods and concepts for preserving location privacy are
explained in order to represent a comprehensive perspective about addressing the
issue.
4.1 Location cloaking
Location cloaking is usually the practice of adjusting the loaction information reso-
lution according to speciﬁed anonymity needs of a user. This adjustment is done by
reducing the accuracy in terms of space (spatial cloaking) or time (temporal cloaking)
[18].
As explained in [10], by using spatial cloaking techniques, a client's precise location
gets degraded into a spatial area for preserving their privacy given the clients' privacy
expectations. In addition, k-anonymity and minimum spatial area are introduced as
the most common techniques used currently. Mrorover, A spatial cloaking algorithm
is implemented whether on the client device or a trusted third party to blur their
location before connecting to a location-based database server.
4.1.1 k-anonymity
In order to use location-based services, the user has to report their location to the
service that lets the service identify the user. k-anonymity tackles this problem by
assigning at least k 1 other users in the cloaked location and exposing this location
to the service. According to [10], there are two diﬀerent ways to cloak a location by
this means. Firstly, using a trusted central server in order to deploy k-anonymity
algorithms. Here, the server connects to the location-based service instead of the
user and the server knows the location of all its contacting users. Secondly, the users
themselves determine the cloaked location by trusting in each other.
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Figure 4.1 Distributed k-anonymity system model. The directory server provides the
contact information of a location broker for the user to register their location (cell). After-
wards, the user can contact the location brokers and a secure comparison server to get to
know if there exist at least k users in their cell, from [45].
Zhong and Hengartner in [45], propose a distributed k-anonymity system in which a
set of servers are deployed to calculate the cloaking areas without the need to trust
a single server or all the other users. The system works in two phases: ﬁrst, by using
a distributed k-anonymity protocol, a user determines if there are k other people in
the area in collaboration with a set of diﬀerent servers and a third party. Second,
another protocol stops the association of a user to more than one server.
The distributed k-anonymity system introduced in [45] comprises 4 diﬀerent parts
as shown in Figure 4.1:
 A location broker.
 Users.
 A secure comparison server.
 The directory server.
First, there are multiple location brokers each of which belong to a diﬀerent orga-
nization and maintain the information about a subset of users in the current cell
throughout the coverage area.
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Second, there are users that have the freedom to report their current location to one
of the location brokers.
Third, there is a secure comparison server that covers the whole coverage area and
deals with the users to acknowledge them if there are at least k other users in the
current cell. In addition, each secure comparison server is maintained by a diﬀerent
organization.
Fourth, there is the directory server that broadcasts the contact information of the
coverage area for both the location brokers and the secure comparison servers.
k-anonymity is prone to two kinds of attacks, namely homogeneity attack and back-
ground knowledge attack. Homogeneity Attack is the practice of extracting a user
attribute from a dataset, since all the attribute values are the same in one equiva-
lence group [35]. Background knowledge attack is the practice of associating certain
attributes in a dataset to a user, due to the access of an adversary to background
knowledge about a user's attributes [13].
In order to illustrate how k-anonymity can be defeated by an adversary, an example
from [32] will be preseneted in the following. In this example user attributes are
categorized as sensitive and non-sensitive. Sensitive data includes private informa-
tion e.g. health details. Non-sensitive data consists of information that is usually
publicly accessible e.g. zip code, age, and nationality. Moreover, it is the sensitive
data that is not supposed to be exposed to an attacker. This example includes med-
ical records of a ﬁctitious hospital that can be seen in Table 4.1 as a 4-anonymous
table.
In a homogeneity attack, suppose an attacker has access to the table and knows
that a speciﬁc patient is 31 years old and lives in a neighborhood with the zip code
13053. Firstly, they can see that the patient must belong to one of the two groups
having a zip code 130**. Secondly, considering the age column it is obvious that
the patient must belong to the group with age assigned as 3*. As a result, it can
be concluded that the patient has cancer due to lack of diversity in the sensitive
attributes.
In a background knowledge attack, suppose that the attacker knows that a patient
is a 21-year old Japanese person living in zip code 13068. Therefore, the patient
must belong to the group having zip code 130** and age of < 30. Consequently, the
patient may have either a heart disease or viral infection. However, the adversary
has the background knowledge that Japanese tend to have low incidence of heart
diseases. So the attacker concludes that the person has a viral infection.
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Table 4.1 Example of data division as in a 4-anonymous table given the non-sensitive
data.
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 130** < 30 * Heart Disease
2 130** < 30 * Heart Disease
3 130** < 30 * Viral Infection
4 130** < 30 * Viral Infection
5 1485*  40 * Cancer
6 1485*  40 * Heart Disease
7 1485*  40 * Viral Infection
8 1485*  40 * Viral Infection
9 130** 3 * Cancer
10 130** 3 * Cancer
11 130** 3 * Cancer
12 130** 3 * Cancer
4.1.2 L-diversity
According to Machanavajjhala et al. in [32], l-diversity is similar to k-anonymity, so
that the same algorithms are used in both of them. However, l-diversity provides
diversity among the sensitive attributes of the anonymized group by preventing
sensitive attributes to be disclosed to attackers by making a user's attributes indis-
tinguishable from l-1 other attributes.
A 3-diverse table has been depicted in Table 4.2. Given the abovementioned scenario
for k-anonymity, the homogeneity attack is defeated as the attacker cannot ﬁgure
out if a 31-year old patient living in zip code 13053 has either heart disease, viral
infection, or cancer. In the background knowledge attack, a 21-year old Japanese
patient living in zip code 13068 given the attacker's background knowledge, may
have either cancer or a viral infection. It is worth mentioning that l-diversity method
gets more challenging to implement when there exist multiple sensitive attributes
in the table. In addition, diversity in k-anonymity is achieved according to the non-
sensitive data, whereas, in l-diversity, diversity is achieved according to the sensitive
data.
4.1.3 Onion routing
In order to preserve privacy in a network, both the content of a message and the
communicating parties must be hidden from adversaries. Cryptography helps to
hide the content of a message, however, the sender and receiver can still be identiﬁed
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Table 4.2 Example of data division as in a 3-diverse table given the sensitive data.
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 1305*  40 * Heart Disease
4 1305*  40 * Viral Infection
9 1305*  40 * Cancer
10 1305*  40 * Cancer
5 1485* > 40 * Cancer
6 1485* > 40 * Heart Disease
7 1485* > 40 * Viral Infection
8 1485* > 40 * Viral Infection
2 1306*  40 * Heart Disease
3 1306*  40 * Viral Infection
11 1306*  40 * Cancer
12 1306*  40 * Cancer
through traﬃc analysis and eavesdropping. Onion routing implements anonymous
connections in packet-switching networks that is applicable to both connectionless
and connection-based protocols in bidirectional communications networks. Onion
routing runs by dynamically creating anonymous connections throughout a series of
onion routers. An onion routing protocol is implemented in three diﬀerent stages;
connection setup, data movement, and connection teardown as follows [17]:
In the ﬁrst stage an onion is built by the initiator, in which a path is created
throughout the network. The characteristics of the route are then added repeatedly
to the payload of the message; then by the use of the onion public key, the data gets
encrypted. Afterwards, the message is sent and one layer of encryption is removed
by each onion router through the path until the message arrives at the receiver as a
plaintext. Finally, connection teardown occurs at the end or at any point along the
path when needed. As a result, it is diﬃcult to trace a packet along the network.
However, due to the generated data overhead, an onion routing network consumes
high amount of power for its operation.
4.1.4 Location uncertainty via resolution reduction
Another method for preserving location privacy is proposed by Cheng et al. in [9]
by which the location information in space and time is degraded in order to lower
the resolution of the location data that is accessible to the location-based services.
The framework cloaks the location information of a user by reporting a larger area
as the current location of the user.
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Figure 4.2 Managing Privacy and Service Quality with the Cloaking Agent, from [9].
Therefore, a user gains a higher level of location privacy by reducing the ﬁtness of
their location information granularity. On the other hand, the quality of service
provided by the LBS also reduces. In order to provide a trade-oﬀ between the
quality of service and the privacy of the users, adjusting the accuracy of the location
information can be an option for the users. For instance, a social networking service
that provides the information about some speciﬁc event in a city does not need to
know the precise location of a user within the city. The proposed system is shown
in Figure 4.2 where it lets the user to choose their location, service request, and
privacy preferences and report it to the cloaking agent. The cloaked location and
the imprecise service request is then generated by the cloaking agent. Finally the
LBS responds to the user with the appropriate information. [9]
4.1.5 Dummy messages
As described by Kido et al. in [27], in this technique, a user produces several bogus
location data (dummies) and sends them to the LBS along with their true location.
Then the LBS respond to all these location queries without knowing which of them
really belongs to the user while the user knows which information response to rely
on.
In addition, the LBS should not be able to infer the true location of the user.
For this, the produced dummy messages must not be distinguishable from the true
data. For example, such a true datum can be the distance traveled by a car in a
navigation system. This traveled distance is limited during a certain period of time.
Consequently, a set of randomly generated dummy messages makes it easy for the
LBS to determine if it is false data. In the algorithm in [27] the location of the ﬁrst
dummy message is generated randomly and the next dummy message gets generated
in the neighborhood of the location of the current dummy message.
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Figure 4.3 Three obfuscation methods. The dark blue circle shows the measured area of
user location and light blue circle shows the obfuscated area of user location.
4.2 Obfuscation
As explained by Ardagna et al. [4], obfuscation is the act of perturbing users' mea-
sured location information, in order to preserve their location privacy. The key
features of location obfuscation proposed in their paper are: ﬁrstly, to let users
choose their privacy preferences and secondly, to implement the privacy preferences
against adversary attacks. Since the precision of user position is prone to measure-
ment errors, which are caused by sensing technologies, the users' position is most
often illustrated as planar circular areas. In [4], location obfuscation is implemented
by reducing location accuracy by means of three obfuscation operators, as illustrated
in Figure 4.3:
 Enlargement: Increasing the radius of the measured area from r1 to r2 with
r1 < r2, in order to decrease the probability of the real location of a user to
be in the obfuscated area.
 Reduction: Although reducing the radius of the measured area from r1 to r2
with r1 > r2, seems to be in conﬂict with the obfuscation concept, it reduces
the probability of the real position to be in the obfuscated area.
 Shifting: Shifting the center of the measured area from c1 to c2 so that given
d to be the distance between the centers of the areas then d < 2r1.
4.3 Connection-free RSS measurement
Privacy issues in location based services (LBS) arise, as WLAN positioning systems
usually need both the received signal strength and the location of access points in
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order to calculate the location of a user. The information about access points is not
usually available explicitly by a user. Moreover, network providers are usually the
ones who have access to this information that makes it impossible for the users to
calculate their position locally [19].
According to [19], by handing the procedure of position calculations to users' own
devices, a network is only in charge of providing the necessary data. Therefore,
the desired level of privacy will be attained. In addition, users take the liberty of
whether keeping the data privately or sharing it with whoever they want.
There are three main infrastructures in positioning methods: infrastructure based,
terminal assisted, and terminal based. It was mentioned before that the last one is
the most privacy friendly method in which signal strength and position calculation
are implemented in users' devices. However, it has its own drawback. As the
device has to acquire some positioning related data from the infrastructure making
it possible for the LBS provider to track the person.
In order to tackle the stated problems, Gschwandtner and Schindhelm [19] proposed
a new positioning method for guaranteeing privacy preserving of the users, which is
done by modifying the WLAN such that the locations of access points are inserted
in WLAN 802.11 MAC management frames. Diﬀerent parts of a management frame
are shown in Figure 4.4(a). A management frame is broadcast by an access point to
inform the users about the network features. IEEE 802.11 protocol makes it possible
to feed in extra data, such as Information Elements (IEs), as shown in Figure 4.4(b),
in the data ﬁeld of a management frame. Information Elements of type 221 are not
reserved by IEEE 802.11, therefore, they can be used to feed in vendor speciﬁc
payload. In order to allow the users to be able to distinguish between diﬀerent
vendors, the data ﬁeld includes a 3-byte OUI (Organizationally Unique Identiﬁer),
which identiﬁes the vendor. By inserting the coordinates of the access points in
the data ﬁeld (vendor speciﬁc data) of a management frame, a user can perform
the positioning process locally on their own device without the need of sending its
location information or MAC ID to a server.
The proposed system works well if a proximity sensing technique is used for posi-
tioning, since the transmitted data per beacon will be around 13 bytes. However,
in case of a ﬁngerprinting system, more complex adjustments must be done so that
the radio map can be transferred to user's device.
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Figure 4.4 IEEE 802.11 Management Frame with Information Elements (IEs). The IEs
reside within the Data ﬁeld, which restricts the overall length of the IEs to a maximum of
2312 bytes.
4.4 Other methods
In this section further ideas and concepts will be brieﬂy introduced about both
privacy and security subjects in user positioning area.
4.4.1 Preserving Location Privacy in Wireless LANs
In order to increase privacy protection in LBS, Jiang et al. [26] proposed to obfuscate
some of the sensitive data, i.e. user signal strength, identity and time of transmission,
transmitted by a mobile entity. Based on the results in [26], a user will not be
traceable among N other mobile subscribers at the same location (with N=1000 in
[26]) by any potential attacker. The downside of this method is that it degrades the
service quality and users will experience delay in their communications due to the
silent periods in applications such as Voice-over-IP. In addition, the designed system
allows the users to choose the level of privacy. The system works as follows, in three
stages.
First, the system uses anonymity to deter an adversary from using one's identity as
a tool for tracking them. It is important to know that MAC and IP addresses of a
device are assigned to a user as their identity in 802.11 WLAN systems. Although
the frequent alteration of the pseudonyms can preserve a user's identity, it can also
lead to some design problems. As for the MAC addresses, there is the probability
of collision if they are randomly selected. In the proposed system, there is a local
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MAC address pool from which, a user is assigned a MAC address called the joint
address when trying to connect to an access point as shown in Figure 4.5.
Second, the system employs a silent period in order to stop adversaries from corre-
lating the collected pseudonyms to one speciﬁc user. By employing a silent period,
the user stops transmitting any data and it lets the sender to mix in with the other
nodes. However, the eﬃciency of this approach is dependent on the density of the
users. For instance, if a user is staying at home, changing the pseudonyms and
using the silent period cannot really protect the user against the attacks. It is worth
mentioning that privacy preserving methods have the best results in public places.
In addition, using real-time communications can be problematic if the silent period
is applied during data transmission. As a result, an opportunistic silent period is
used to tackle this problem by which, the system changes the pseudonyms when the
transmission has stopped for a longer period than the silent period.
Third, transmission power control (TPC) is applied to ensure a decline in positioning
accuracy. Research shows that the more access points in reach of the user, the more
precisely it can be located. As a result, the system reduces its transmission power
so that a minimum number of APs are heard by the user's device, ensuring at least
one AP to be accessible to the device all the time.
4.4.2 Secure LBS in Mobile Cloud Computing
Another proposal presented by Zhu et al. [46] tries to address both the security and
the privacy issues regarding mobile could computing, as more users choose cloud
services for data storage and computation purposes. Applying location-based ﬁne-
grained access control mechanism has been proposed in [46] for securing user data
against unauthorized attacks and also for privacy protection against LBS providers.
The designed mobile cloud system comprises three entities as shown in Figure 4.6.
 Mobile Users.
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Figure 4.6 Location-based service architecture.
 Location-based Serivce Provider.
 Certiﬁcation Center.
First, there are mobile users requesting the LBS data. Therefore, they are assigned
a service certiﬁcate with speciﬁc access rights. The user can access the positioning
data using GPS or a location information provider.
Second, there is Location-based Service Provider that oﬀers the LBS for a user,
given their location and request.
Third, there is the certiﬁcation center which functions as a trusted third party
and issues certiﬁcates for the users and produces the essential public parameter
information to ensure secure LBSs.
By switching the service authentication to the client side, it becomes impossible for
the LBS providers to access the user information. In this system, the certiﬁcate
center is responsible for providing the service certiﬁcate. As the LBS provider gets
the user's request and their location, it authenticates the access privilege and receives
the LBS appeal securely. Then, the LBS provider processes the related data from
data provider given the location of the user. Afterwards, the data is encrypted by
the LBS provider and the user receives the ciphertext. Finally, it is the authorized
user that is able to employ decryption to convert the ciphertext and extract the data
using their private key.
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Therefore, by implementing attribute-based encryption (ABE) and using integer
comparison methods, only the mobile entity has the authority to access the location
data. The attributes presented in this system are stored on the client's mobile device
and called ServiceName, Period-of-Validity, ServiceArea, Category, and Quality of
Service (QoS) as shown in table 4.3. The two latter attributes are integers deﬁned
by the service providers.
Table 4.3 Attribute lists for data user's service certiﬁcate (access privileges)
ServiceName Period-of-Validity ServiceArea Category QoS
Wireless 2010/01/10-/06/15 (Phoenix) =2(FamilyPlan)  3(LowRate)
4.4.3 Cloud-Based Positioning
Homomorphic encryption is an encryption method that enables certain types of cal-
culations to be performed on ciphertext without having access to the decryption
key. Homomorphic encryption is a way to provide user defense against cyber adver-
saries' attacks that may happen during transmission of data to cloud servers that
handle the calculations. As a result, a server makes the calculations on encrypted
data and the mobile device is in charge of decryption. In contrast with the common
encryption methods, the aforementioned algorithm not only is more secure, but also
less complex. Moreover, it does not aﬀect the accuracy of positioning results [15].
By using normal encryption methods, a cloud server will not be able to perform
computations on the ciphertext. Hence, the decryption key has to be shared with
the cloud server. In contrast, homomorphic encryption allows arbitrary functions
to be performed on the decrypted data. For example, it is possible to add two
encrypted numbers using this method without exposing either of the numbers to
the adder.
Assuming a and b to be two integers with  and 
 as addition and multiplication
signs subsequently, and considering E () as an Encryption function, Equations 4.1
and 4.2 show that E (a + b) and E (a  b) can be calculated based on the encrypted
values of a and b.
E(a+ b) = fE(a); E(b)g (4.1)
E(a b) = 
fE(a); E(b)g (4.2)
The proposed system is illustrated in Figure 4.7 and it works as follows: ﬁrst,
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Figure 4.7 Architecture of a secure cloud-based positioning system based on homomorphic
encryption, from [15].
the device gathers the received signal strength measurements and the data gets
encrypted. Second, the encrypted message is transferred to the untrusted cloud
server. Consequently, the cloud server calculates the position of the device using
encrypted data. As a result, the data does not get exposed to the cloud server.
Lastly, the encrypted data is sent to the device and it extracts the data.
4.4.4 Secure Localization in Wireless Sensor Networks
A wireless sensor network (WSN) faces a large variety of attacks, such as sinkhole,
wormhole and Sybil attacks. All these can compromise the positioning process in
two ways as follows [25].
First, an adversary may counterfeit the identity of another node that brings about
the necessity for a secure node authentication (SNA). It contains the following cat-
egories:
 Secure Localization for Unknown Nodes:
1. Range-based Secure Localization: Veriﬁable multilateration (VM) is a
method proposed by Capkun and Hubaux [6] to assure secure positioning
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based on distance-bounding protocols. VM is based on measuring the
time-of-ﬂight of the transmitted signals, by using a minimum of three,
not necessarily synchronized, access points for verifying the location of
the nodes.
2. Range-free Secure Localization: SeRLoc is a distributed range-free local-
ization algorithm proposed by Lazos and Poovendran [30] that functions
without the need for communication between the nodes. In SeRLoc there
are some higher-power sectored antennas regarded as trusted locators,
transmission range of which is higher than unknown nodes. The system
works as the locators broadcast their position and sectors, afterwards the
nodes calculate their position as the center of gravity of the overlapping
locators' signal.
 Secure Localization for Anchor Nodes:
LAD (Localization Anomaly Detection) is an abnormal anchor node detection
scheme proposed by [12], which exploits the fact that sensors are mostly im-
plemented in groups. Consequently, a deployment model is introduced so that
nodes are located on a grid. Furthermore, the model follows a two-dimensional
Gaussian distribution centering in the deploying point of the group. Having
installed the nodes, each node has a recognized position. During the monitor-
ing phase, LAD compares the calculated positions of the unknown nodes with
the unknown deployment information and checks if they are consistent, given
the following metrics: the Diﬀerence metric, Add-All metric and Probability
metric.
4.4.5 Privacy in Social Network Services
Durr et al. proposed a new cross-layer protocol in [14] that is implemented as a se-
cure and privacy-friendly framework for a peer-to-peer location-based social network
called Vegas, which is personalized for reliable location-based advertising services.
The design goals of the protocol are as follows. It must be able to: authenticate
the advertised service, analyze the content of the advertisement and conﬁgure a re-
verse communication channel from the mobile entity to the access point for extra
services. As a result, identiﬁcation and data parts of the advertisement service are
combined into the MAC frame and UDP packet respectively. Consequently, two
new IEs are embedded into the beacon frame; one of which is LB-SNS Certiﬁcate
Fragment (LCF) including AP certiﬁcates, and the other one is LB-SNS Identity
and Authentication (LIA) including service identiﬁers and associated authentica-
tion information.
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Figure 4.8 Vegas model.
Figure 4.8 shows the Vegas architecture in which a customer uses a mobile or sta-
tionary client to connect to a social network. An asynchronous message exchange
is performed by Vegas depeneding on a common service such as email or SMS, by
which exchanger unit is deployed. In order to keep the location privacy of the users,
each pair of friends generates a public key pair to encrypt messages. As a result,
a user's message can be identiﬁed and mapped to that user only by its friend that
knows which public key belongs to which friend. The datastore is used to keep the
proﬁle for each customer and the exchanger is used for delivering messages between
users. Furthermore, the address of the exchanger of each user is known to their
friends in the system.
4.4.6 Attack Detection in Wireless Localization
The positioning infrastructure is prone to non-cryptographic attacks, such as signal
attenuation and ampliﬁcation, that cannot be tackled by common security services.
As mentioned in [7], wireless devices, i.e. anchor/unknown nodes could be exposed to
lower/physical layer attacks in a network. First, due to simplicity of wireless network
architecture, it is unfeasible to implement traditional cryptographic methods for such
systems. Second, wireless devices are vulnerable to physical attacks, for instance,
signal attenuation, ampliﬁcation, or reﬂection by an adversary. In order to address
the aforementioned issues, Chen et al. proposed an attack detection method based
on statistical signiﬁcance testing that is tailored to suit multilateration and signal
strength localization techniques. Practical trace-driven approaches evaluated the
scenarios on both Wi-Fi and ZigBee networks and proved the reliability and accuracy
of the algorithms [7].
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5. IMPLEMENTATIONS OF USER TRACKING
IN A TERMINAL-BASED SYSTEM
Positioning with means of wireless MAC addresses of a device will be implemented to
illustrate how accurately and reliably a mobile device can be positioned indoors. And
to try to prove better the signiﬁcant motivation for studying the existing privacy-
preserving location algorithms as it was done in Chapters 3 and 4 so far. Speciﬁcally,
terminal-based positioning using only MAC addresses and RSS values of access
points. In addition, terminal-based positioning is easy to implement on users' devices
and it is the most privacy-preserving positioning method. As a result, it is important
to know how a user device can be independently positioned on a terminal-based
system.
5.1 Terminal-based positioning
This chapter compares two diﬀerent positioning methods. First, a common position-
ing method is implemented using the collected MAC addresses and the measured
RSS values. This method has long been used for positioning, e.g. in [5]. Second,
another positioning method known as rank-based positioning [31] is implemented us-
ing only the observed MAC addresses of access points without using the measured
RSS values.
5.1.1 Oine phase
The WLAN ﬁngerprints were collected in 2011 by a measurement campaing in the
Department of Electronics and Communications Engineering with a Windows tablet
in 4 main ﬂoors of one of the buildings in Tampere University of Technology in
Tampere, Finland [39]. During the oine phase, RSS values and MAC addresses
of the heard access points were stored in a radio map in 1479 reference points. In
addition, each reference point is a single point in the radio map that corresponds to
a 5m-by-5m synthetic grid in the real map. The ﬁngerprint dataset is ﬂoor-wise and
the height of each ﬂoor is added as a z-dimension to the map. The MAC addresses
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Figure 5.1 The locations of 1479 ﬁngerprinted reference points belonging to a 4-ﬂoor
university building collected during oine phase, SCALE 1:1405 cm.
are mapped to indices from 1 to 309. Since the access points support multiple
BSSIDs, several MAC addresses may belong to the same access point. In addition,
the locations of the access points are unknown. The 3D coordinates (x,y,z) map of
the ﬁngerprints are shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of all the measured RSS values as a histogram. X
axis shows the RSS values, which are sorted into 20 equally spaced bins along the
x-axis between -100 dB and -20 dB and the height of each rectangle indicates the
number of RSS in the bin.
5.1.2 Online phase
During the online phase the same Windows tablet was used to measure the received
signal strength in 490 points. The available dataset comprises the coordinates of
the locations and the heard MAC addresses and their RSSs.
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Figure 5.2 Histogram of the RSS values measured during the oine stage in the ﬁnger-
printing process.
5.1.3 Positioning using received signal strength and MAC ad-
dresses
In this subsection positioning will be conducted by exploiting both the MAC ad-
dresses and RSS values as follows. First, the common access points that are heard
by the mobile station and the reference points at the tracking points are determined.
Then the reference points that have the maximum number of common access points
with a tracking point are chosen.
Finally, using k-nearest neighbor method (NNM) as shown in Equation 5.1 the
minimum power diﬀerence between the observed RSS values by mobile station and
ﬁngerprinted RSS values is calculated and the location of one of the reference points
that has the minimum power diﬀerence in RSS values with the tracking point is
assigned as that point's location.
Cf =
1
Nheard
X
APheard
(RSSf;AP  RSSMS;AP )
2: (5.1)
where Cf being the cost function per ﬁngerprint, Nheard being the number of heard
APs, APheard being the index of heard access points, RSSf;AP being ﬁngerprinted
RSS values of an AP, and RSSMS;AP being the observed RSS values by mobile
station. Figure 5.3 shows the estimated locations of the mobile device that have
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Figure 5.3 The calculated locations of 20% of 490 tracking points using received signal
strength and MAC addresses. Black crosses show the true locations and blue dots show the
estimated locations that are connected by the red lines, SCALE 1:1405 cm.
been calculated using this method.
The mean error of the positioning process was 6.25 meters. This method achieves
better than 11 m accuracy in 90% of the cases and the correct ﬂoor detection prob-
ability was 88%.
5.1.4 Positioning using MAC addresses
In this subsection, positioning will be performed using the least amount of available
information including the ﬁngerprinting dataset and the observed MAC addresses
of the access points by the mobile station. The goal is to evaluate the reliability of
a simple positioning algorithm and to see how accurately it can reveal the location
of the user. First, the common heard access points by the tracking points and the
reference points are saved into a 490 by 1479 matrix. Afterwards, the maximum
value in each row is chosen. This indicates which reference points have the highest
number of access points in common with that particular tracking point. Then, by
using the indices of these reference points the coordinates of the reference points are
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Figure 5.4 The calculated locations of 20% of 490 tracking points using only MAC ad-
dresses. Black crosses show the true locations and blue dots show the estimated locations
that are connected by the red lines, SCALE 1:1405 cm.
fetched and in order to estimate the location of one tracking point, an averaging is
performed on the coordinates of the reference points. The ﬁnal positioning results
can be seen in Figure 5.4. The mean error is about 7:40 meters and we can reach
an accuracy below 30 m in 90% of the cases.
Since the location of the user is based on averaging the coordinates of a number of
reference points, the calculated location may be in some place between two diﬀerent
ﬂoors. Therefore, in this next stage the estimated z coordinate will be mapped to
its closest neighboring ﬂoor. The resulted map can be seen in Figure 5.5. During
this stage, the correct ﬂoor detection probability was 46%.
5.1.5 Floor cluster-based positioning using MAC addresses
In order to ﬁnd the location of the user; ﬁrst, the common APs between reference
points in each ﬂoor and all the tracking points are determined in four diﬀerent
vectors each of which represent one of the ﬂoors. Then, the vector that contains the
maximum number of common APs is selected. Afterwards, all the reference points
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Figure 5.5 The calulated locations of 20% of 490 tracking points using only MAC ad-
dresses with mapped z coordinates. Black crosses show the true locations and blue dots
show the mapped locations that are connected by the red lines, SCALE 1:1405 cm.
that have the maximum common access points in the vector are picked out. Finally,
the location of the tracking point is estimated by averaging over the coordinates x
and y of selected reference points in the previous step. It is worth mentioning that
since the averaging is performed over reference points that all belong to one ﬂoor,
no more processing is needed over the z axis. The estimated location of the tracking
points are depicted in Figure 5.6.
The mean error of the positioning was 8.04 meters. We could achieve an accuracy
below 28 m in 90% of the cases and the correct ﬂoor detection probability was 73%.
The error distance CDF for the three positioning methods can be seen in Figure
5.7. In addition, Table 5.1 represents a comparison among three methods in terms
of ﬂoor detection probability, RMSE, and accuracy. As it can be seen, positioning
using RSS is still the most accurate method and ﬂoor clustering did not increase the
positioning accuracy signiﬁcantly.
To sum up, it can be concluded that although using only MAC addresses for po-
sitioning is not as accurate as the traditional ways, it can still be implemented for
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Figure 5.6 The calculated locations of 20% of 490 tracking points by Floor cluster-based
positioning using MAC addresses. Black crosses show the true locations and blue dots show
the estimated locations that are connected by the red lines, SCALE 1:1405 cm.
Table 5.1 Positioning results based on ﬂoor detection, RMSE, and accuracy.
Positioning Method Floor detection probability RMSE [m] Accuracy < 10m probability
RSS+MAC 88% 6.25 86%
MAC 46% 7.40 40%
MAC+Clustering 73% 8.04 44%
positioning and tracking the mobile users. In addition, the results show that on the
one hand by performing the positioning on a user's device a certain level of privacy
can be achieved, but on the other hand an adversary can implement applications on
a user's device to access data from the phone sensors and calculate the position of
a user.
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Figure 5.7 Error distance CDF for all 3 methods used in this chapter.
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6. IMPLEMENTATIONS OF USER TRACKING
IN A NETWORK-BASED SYSTEM
Many retailers have started collecting their customers' MAC addresses through their
Wi-Fi connections for tracking the visitors. The tracking data is used to check
whether a customer is a regular visitor or to ﬁnd out which sites, shops or shelves
in a shop they visited most frequently. For instance, Nordstrom, a retail chain in
the United States, already tracks its customers' movements in its stores by means
of sensors installed in a number of the stores [11]. The purpose of this tracking
is to determine customer's behaviors in the stores for advertising and marketing.
Consequently, customers' privacy gets violated without their acknowledgement [23].
This chapter focuses on some examples, based again on measurement data, of what
kind of location information can be achieved by the network, a Location Based Server
or a third party, from an unsuspecting user. The objective is to demonstrate that
such localization can be in fact achieved with a relatively low amount of information
about the user terminal, such as its MAC address and, possibly, some RSS values
from or to other access nodes in range.
Two measurement databases are used:
 One of the database has been collected through a research conducted by Shweta
Shretha, Elina Laitinen, Jukka Talvitie, and Simona Lohan at TUT during
2014 using a Nexus tablet and proprietary software with building maps.
 The second database was provided by TUT IT services, in conglomerate and
anonymized form, and with hashed IDs. This was done in order to fully pre-
serve the anonymity of the users.
The goal in using the ﬁrst database is to show what kind of information can be
achieved about the network by a possible attacker who has access to a ﬁngerprints
database or to devices to measure the radiomap of a building. This ﬁrst aspect
relates to the network security in positioning. We will show that even without
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network information, the Access Point location can be easily estimated from the
radiomap of the building.
The goal in using the second database is to show to which extent users can be
tracked based on the information that can be collected by the network, namely the
user terminal MAC addresses and possibly their RSS values as measured at the
network side.
6.1 Network-based positioning
In this section, two diﬀerent approaches given security and privacy in Wireless LAN
will be analyzed. In terms of security, a simulation will be run in order to investigate
how feasible it is for an adversary to ﬁnd the physical location of access points using
the radiomap in a building. Positioning will be implemented using ﬁrst both the
RSS and MAC addresses and then only using the MAC addresses.
The data from the oine phase contains ﬁngerprints collected with a Nexus tablet in
two frequency bands, i.e. 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz, on four ﬂoors of a university building.
The data is mapped to a 2m-by-2m synthetic grid. In addition, 422 MAC addresses
were scanned in the oine phase and the number of online phase reference locations
is 1803. Figure 6.1(a) shows the location of reference points on the building plan.
Figure 6.1(b) illustrates how 64805 samples of the received signal are distributed
based on their strength. The highest number of received signal strengths had a
value between -81 dB and -80 dB with 3748 samples. Furthermore, the location of
the access points are not available in the dataset.
It is worth mentioning that the histograms shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure 6.1(b)
represent the distribution of RSS values in the same building, but after a big change
in the WiFi infrastructure, meaning that the AP locations in the dataset used in
Figure 5.2 have been diﬀerent from the AP locations in the set used for Figure
6.1(b).
As a result of this change in the WiFi infrastructure, the percentage of RSS values
in the range of -92 dB and -80 dB decreased from 44% to 33% in the radiomaps.
This shows that a change in the network has occured.
6.2 Security-related example
Given security matters, it is worth knowing if an adversary can ﬁnd the physical
location of access points by scanning the MAC addresses and their related RSS in
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order to create a map of the access points in a building. By assuming that the
created radiomap by an adversary is the same one as introduced in the previous
section, the coordinates of each access point are estimated using weighted centroid
that is formulated for each axis as follows:
Cx =
P
CixRSSiP
RSSi
;
Cy =
P
CiyRSSiP
RSSi
;
Cz =
P
CizRSSiP
RSSi
:
(6.1)
where i refers to the AP index and the three components (Cix,Ciy,Ciz) specify the
location coordinates in which APi was heard wtih RSSi. (Cx,Cy,Cz) is the calculated
coordinate of each access point.
The result of this calculation can be seen in Figure 6.2(a) as the real locations of
the access points and their estimated locations are shown with red circles for the
former and blue circles for the latter. After calculating the coordinates of the access
points, the estimated values of the z axis were mapped to the nearest ﬂoor height
of the building, i.e. 0, 3.7, 7.4, 11.1. As the error distance CDF diagram in Figure
6.2(b) illustrates, in around 80% of cased, the AP position can be estimated with
less than 10 meters error.
I obtained the real coordinates of the access points in the following way: First, I
found the physical location of each access point (each AP has a unique ID that is
written on it) and marked it on the building map. Then, I mapped the marked
locations on a digital map of the building to extract the corresponding coordinates
of each location from this map.
6.3 Privacy-related example
The data in this phase was gathered by the IT administration of Tampere University
of Technology during a one-week period in March, 2015. The collected data includes
the received MAC address from a device and its RSS. The devices are deﬁned as all
mobile users who were in the building. In order to preserve their privacy, the MAC
addresses were hashed by the IT administration. The raw data included 136487
collected MAC address samples. However, after the erroneous samples were omitted
from the dataset, the number of samples dropped to 56520.
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6.3.1 Positioning using received signal strength and MAC ad-
dresses
The process of positioning deployed in this stage is the same as used in subsection
5.1.3. The result of the positioning can be seen in Figure 6.3. Since the real locations
of the users were unknown, it was impossible to provide comparison analysis as pre-
sented in the previous chapter for the positioning process. However, by contrasting
Figure 6.1(a), which shows the location of the reference points, and Figure 6.3 it can
be seen that the calculated locations of the users in ﬁrst and second ﬂoors do not
match to the locations of the reference points. On the other hand, the calculated
locations resemble the locations of the reference points quite well for the third and
fourth ﬂoor. This may occur due to the fact that the density of the reference points
in ﬁrst and second ﬂoor is much higher in comparison with the other two ﬂoors.
As a result, it can be said that ﬁngerprints which are based on samples from dense
reference points do not increase the positioning accuracy necessarily and can lead
to much longer processing time. Furthermore, the results show that user position
distribution is mostly on the corridors and lecture rooms, which are situated in ﬁrst
and second ﬂoor. All in all, it can be concluded that user positions can be tracked
by a network.
6.3.2 Positioning using MAC addresses
The positioning process in this stage has been done using the same algorithm used
in subsection 5.1.4. The results are shown as diagrams in Figure 6.4, where Figure
6.4(a) illustrates the density of user positions per access points and Figure 6.4(b)
shows the percentage of positioned users per ﬂoor. As it can be seen, most of the
detected devices were located in the second and third ﬂoors. Since by using MAC
addresses for positioning only the location of associated access points are detected,
maps of user density per access points for each ﬂoor are provided in Figure 6.5.
Where the blue dots illustrate the location of APs and the red circles indicate the
density of located users per that access point. The larger the circle the higher the
density of users per corresponding AP. In addition, Figure 6.5(b) and Figure 6.5(c)
show higher user density per AP in 2nd and 3rd ﬂoors, in contrast with the other
ﬂoors.
To sum up, a network can still discover the location of its users with an accuracy
that has a direct relationship with the density of the access points installed in its
buildings.
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(a) The locations of 1803 ﬁngerprinted reference points belonging to 4 main ﬂoors of a university
collected during oine phase, SCALE 1:1405 cm.
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(b) Distribution histogram of the receiced signal strength.
Figure 6.1 The plan of the building used for ﬁngerprinting and the distribution of the
received signal strength in 2.4 GHz band.
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Estimated location of AP
Real location of AP
(a) The real location of access points marked with black crosses and the estimated location of same
access points marked with blue dots, SCALE 1:1405 cm.
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(b) Error distance CDF.
Figure 6.2 Location of access points and the estimated location of them with their error
distance CDF for z axis which is mapped to real heights of the building.
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Figure 6.3 The calculated locations of 56520 user positions using both MAC addresses
and RSS values, SCALE 1:1405 cm.
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(a) Density of user positions per access
point.
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(b) Density of user positions per ﬂoor.
Figure 6.4 Density of detected samples using only MAC addresses.
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(a) 1st ﬂoor. (b) 2nd ﬂoor.
(c) 3rd ﬂoor. (d) 4th ﬂoor.
Figure 6.5 Blue dots and red circles show locations of APs and density of users respec-
tively, SCALE 1:2522 cm.
47
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, a wide variety of papers on the subject of location privacy have been
reviewed. As it has been illustrated, diﬀerent approaches to the matter already
exist. Some try to hide user traces in the communications network and some use
location cloaking to combine a set of locations to be introduced as the user location.
However, many companies and retailers have started collecting the MAC addresses
of their customers' mobile devices for diﬀerent purposes such as marketing or ﬁnding
customers' positions on their premises. This oﬀers a high motivation for looking for
new privacy preserving methods. Based on this new habit of third parties in WLAN
indoor positioning, it has been one of the goals of this thesis to implement several
positioning methods using only MAC addresses of mobile devices and to compare the
results with the common ways of indoor positioning which use both MAC address
and RSS of a device.
Consequently, positioning was implemented in two infrastructure-based networks
namely terminal-based and network-based conﬁgurations and we depicted how po-
sitioning can be done using simply the MAC addresses being broadcast on the air.
The research area discussed in this thesis is quite new and it tackles the issue of
privacy challenges of the uprising circumstances in indoor positioning. As a result,
future related developments can be in the area of deriving more secure and privacy
preserving location mechanisms for users who visit public places.
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